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Executive summary 
Collusive contracting with private power plants in Bangladesh has resulted in high power 
prices that cost the taxpayer around US$1 billion a year in subsidies, as well as the selection of 
environmentally damaging fuels and technologies. The overpriced plants are also prioritised in 
dispatch orders and fuel supplies, perhaps because their high mark-ups allow them to 
corruptly influence these decisions. A World Bank study of gas-fired plants in 2014 found that 
expensive plants received more orders than cheaper ones, costing the taxpayer US$1.4 billion 
through this misallocation alone. Other types of preferential treatment of privileged 
companies are also reported.   
These problems emerged after 2010 as contracts began to be signed in closed-door 
negotiations between the government and individual investors. However, the suspension of 
competitive procurement rules and of transparency did not happen on a whim. The private 
sector delivered two of the lowest-priced power plants in Asia in the early 2000s in 
competitive tenders, but, later that decade, projects stopped attracting investors. At the heart 
of the problem was the perception of risk in contexts of weak contract enforcement. Private 
power investments involve large upfront outlays with costs and profits recovered over long 
periods. If the rule of law could be quickly improved, that would be a way to reduce risks. But 
otherwise, intermediate solutions have to be found.  
To mitigate risks in high-risk contexts, governments have to provide subsidies to change 
incentives. The Bangladesh experience shows that risk-mitigation subsidies can have 
competitive effects, but other subsidies can support collusive outcomes. Competitive risk-
mitigation subsidies reduce risks for all potential investors interested in a project. They attract 
competition and can reduce prices by much more than the value of the subsidy. They should 
arguably be regarded as public investments with a high social return rather than subsidies. The 
early projects in Bangladesh benefited from such subsidies, including preferential financing 
from international financial institutions (IFIs) and access to leased government land. 
Unfortunately, their significance was not understood. The subsidies were withdrawn and only 
partially reintroduced later. When they were withdrawn, investments dried up. To resolve a 
severe power crisis, the government resorted to a collusive risk-mitigation strategy, engaging 
in closed-door negotiations with single investors to mitigate their risks. This solved the 
investment problem but at a high cost and with much higher subsidies.  
Versions of competitive risk-mitigation subsidies continued in a few projects. We use data 
from 58 private power plants in Bangladesh from 2008 to 2016 to show that even in an overall 
collusive environment, the provision of relatively small risk-mitigation subsidies resulted in a 
62% reduction in plant-level prices in these projects, adjusting for fuel type, generation 
capacity and age. Our analysis of risk perceptions and potential competition provides a 
plausible explanation for this huge price effect. 
The evidence and analysis suggest a feasible and effective anti-collusion strategy for the power 
sector. Given the powerful interests at play, we looked for and identified an instrument that is 
not opposed by powerful players and yet is effective in changing their behaviour. Our analysis 
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also suggests that a full subsidy withdrawal strategy will not solve collusion and corruption 
problems in developing-country power sectors. In fact, the collusion problem emerged as a 
result of an untimely withdrawal of some subsidies. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite much progress over the last decade, power generation and distribution capacities 
remain low relative to the size of the population across South Asia. This is particularly true in 
Bangladesh. The latest comparative figures for the region show that Bangladesh had the 
second lowest electricity consumption per capita and the lowest energy use per capita 
(which includes other forms of energy) (see Table 1). All of South Asia was also well behind 
the average for low- and middle-income countries. 
Table 1. Energy and power use: South Asia 2014 
 Energy use 
(kg of oil equivalent per capita) 
Electric power consumption  
(kWh per capita) 
Bangladesh 229.25 320.20 
Nepal 434.45 146.47 
Pakistan 460.24 447.50 
Sri Lanka 515.51 531.09 
India 636.57 804.51 
Low & middle-income countries 1,331.73 1,934.07 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) 2020. 
Increasing the supply of affordable electricity is therefore widely recognised as critical for 
accelerating and sustaining development in Bangladesh (Planning Commission, 2011). 
However, like many developing countries, Bangladesh has been more successful in 
increasing generation capacity and less so in containing costs and maintaining environmental 
quality. This constrains how effectively generation capacity can be expanded in the future. 
To expand capacity at low cost and with the best technologies, tenders have to attract the 
widest range of bidders. The problem in developing countries is that investments in power 
are often very risky because they require large upfront investments with recovery over long 
periods. In contexts of weak contract enforcement and political risks, the best bidders can 
stay away, leaving the field to politically connected companies. This can result in the 
generation of overpriced power and less clean technologies.  
The design of de-risking strategies can be critical for determining the price and quality of 
power. While well-designed subsidies can, in principle, de-risk investments sufficiently to 
attract competitive investors, badly designed subsidies can significantly raise the price of 
power.  
A competitive de-risking strategy is one that reduces risks for all interested investors to a 
level where multiple investors start engaging in the market, potentially making competitive 
bids and lowering prices to an extent that pays for the cost of the de-risking strategy. The 
result may be an enhanced investment flow, lower prices and the ability to set higher 
technological and environmental standards. The textbook strategy of competitive de-risking 
is to improve the governance climate. Yet this may not be immediately feasible as a de-
risking strategy in many developing countries because policies supporting these 
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improvements may take years to make a difference. Instead, feasible instruments are more 
likely to involve appropriately targeted de-risking subsidies. To support a competitive de-
risking strategy, subsidies have to be contestable. They must be potentially available to all 
competitors who can imagine improving the terms likely to be offered by the parties who 
are perceived to be bid leaders. 
Collusive risk-mitigating strategies, on the other hand, are where governments reduce the 
risks of particular investors through close involvement in negotiations. Such investors are 
likely to be politically connected private companies or public-sector companies from 
countries with close political relationships with the government. This approach can also raise 
investments, by offering attractive terms in direct negotiations, but the absence of 
competition makes it more difficult to contain costs or to specify technologies in line with 
national interests. The potentially higher mark-ups in these contracts also increase the risk 
of rent-sharing arrangements with public officials. This approach too is likely to involve 
subsidies, this time to make power affordable to consumers, but the subsidies are likely to 
be much higher than with competitive risk-mitigation strategies, with a higher total fiscal 
cost of providing power in this way. 
The Bangladesh experience is useful because we find instances of both types of subsidies. In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s there were two very competitive private power projects 
supported by competitive risk-mitigating subsidies. These subsidies were later withdrawn 
and were only available sporadically in a few projects. Facing a severe power crisis, the 
Government of Bangladesh passed the Speedy Supply of Power and Energy Act in 2010 to 
enable power and energy projects to be implemented without competitive tendering. The 
new risk-mitigation strategy that emerged was based on the close involvement of 
government in the selection of investors and closed-door negotiations with them. This 
collusive risk-mitigation strategy was very successful in raising capacity but at a high cost, 
and with much higher subsidies.  
Interestingly, as the earlier forms of subsidies continued now and then in a few projects, we 
are able to compare the effects of subsidy design on pricing. Not only were the average 
prices in projects without competitive risk-mitigation strategies much higher, there was a 
significant increase in the use of dirtier fuels like diesel and furnace oil. But even with these 
fuels, prices were lower in the presence of competitive risk-mitigating subsidies. To reduce 
the over-pricing and the likely corruption and collusion that follow to share these rents, we 
need to identify feasible de-risking strategies that reduce mark-ups and prices by bringing in 
a broader spectrum of bidders. 
The welfare-enhancing role of risk-mitigating subsidies has been recognised for green 
investments in power (Waissbein et al., 2013; Newbery, 2014; Sweerts et al., 2019). 
However, we argue that de-risking subsidies have a more general applicability in enhancing 
the quality of power-sector investments in developing countries – they should be an 
important component of competition-supporting strategies to limit collusive pricing and to 
promote environmentally superior technologies. But we also argue that while some forms of 
subsidy can reduce investor risk, other forms of subsidy may increase risks and may be 
associated with collusive risk-mitigation strategies. Therefore, the policy concern is to 
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understand how subsidy design can improve power-sector outcomes by lowering the overall 
cost of power and the propensity for corruption.  
Using propensity score matching (PSM), we estimate the average treatment effects on the 
treated (ATT) where treatments are different combinations of direct subsidies (access to 
leased land, access to lower-cost financing, or both) and outcomes are plant-level sale prices 
per kilowatt hour (kWh). This method allows us to control for relevant variables that can 
affect plant-level prices including the plant’s age, generation capacity and fuel type (gas, 
heavy furnace oil, diesel or high-speed diesel). It allows us to test our risk-adjusted pricing 
model, which predicts a discontinuous jump in pricing when the withdrawal of direct 
subsidies raises risks above a critical limit. We test this with data from the Bangladesh Power 
Development Board (BPDB) for 58 private plants from 2008–2016, which gives us the prices 
at which each plant sold power over this period, the quantities sold, and the technical 
characteristics of each plant as fuel type, capacity and age. We also have data from the 
Bangladesh Independent Power Producers’ Association (BIPPA), the World Bank, and power-
sector consultants on different types of direct subsidies received by each plant. The two main 
direct subsidies of interest are the provision of partial funding from international financial 
institutions (IFIs) at concessionary rates or partial risk guarantees from IFIs, and the provision 
of leases on government land for the project. The significance of a third direct subsidy, the 
fuel subsidy, cannot be tested because there is no variation in application across plants. 
The evidence shows that relatively limited risk-mitigation support through these direct 
subsidies reduced plant-level power prices by 62.1%. The evidence and our analysis of 
competitive risk-mitigation suggests a feasible anti-collusion and anti-corruption strategy in 
the power sector based on small risk-mitigation subsidies. The optimal level of these 
subsidies will depend on country- and time-specific risks and how the existing system of 
price-setting operates. The relevant point for policy is that direct subsidies are an effective 
tool for reducing power prices by attracting multiple bidders or creating a context of 
potential entry. If policy can reduce risk sufficiently, even a single or small number of bidders 
have to offer competitive prices because of potential entry. The level or type of direct 
subsidies that will have this effect going forward need not be the same as before and is likely 
to be different in other countries. The optimal level can nevertheless be discovered by 
incrementally increasing the value of contestable direct subsidies to the point where 
multiple bidders begin to appear, particularly unconnected bidders, and plant-level power 
prices fall as a result.  
Section 2 of this paper provides further context on the power sector in Bangladesh, 
highlighting relevant features and describing the transformation that happened around 2010 
following introduction of the Speedy Supply of Power and Energy Act  (henceforth the 
Speedy Power Act). Section 3 sets out our theoretical model of the effect of different 
combinations of subsidies on power pricing and section 4 presents the estimation results. 
Section 5 summarises the policy implications of our analysis. 
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2. Power generation in Bangladesh 
2.1. Managing risk for private investors: Bangladesh’s 
subsidy system 
Bangladesh was an early adopter of private investments in the power sector in the 1990s 
and it was understood then that private investors would view this market as risky. They 
would have to contract to supply power and collect payments over the lifetime of a plant, 
which could be fifteen to twenty years or longer. These contracts would be complex, 
specifying the quantity of power each plant had to be ready to deliver, the minimum 
quantities and capacity charges the power purchaser (the BPDB) committed to, the penalties 
each side had to pay if contract commitments were violated, and so on. The interpretation 
and enforcement of these complex agreements in a developing-country context where 
contract enforcement is generally weak exposes investors to risks. The provision of direct 
subsidies in the form of leased land and financing at preferential rates aimed to reduce the 
direct cost of generation and therefore the subsequent risks faced by investors.  
In the first two projects, lower-cost financing came directly from IFIs and from a local non-
bank financier, the Infrastructure Development Company Ltd (IDCOL), which was in turn 
financed by IFIs including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). There 
were also partial risk guarantees from IFIs, which further reduced the cost of capital. Foreign 
currency loans from IFIs were a few percentage points cheaper than any alternative sources 
of funding, and this constituted the subsidy element.  
Appendix A describes the financing structure of the two pathbreaking projects at 
Meghnaghat and Haripur that set some of the lowest power prices in Asia. The projects also 
had land lease arrangements that freed investors from significant transaction costs in 
acquiring land. However, savings from both types of support directly contributed at best a 
few percentage points to the unit cost of power. The effect of financing as much as 60% of 
the project cost at an interest rate 5% lower than the market alternative for a US$340 
million power plant was estimated to reduce the price per kWh by only around 15%  (Asian 
Tiger Capital Partners, 2010). Even the two pioneer projects that received direct IFI financing 
did not benefit from lower interest rates to this extent.  
In later projects with IFI support, the interest rate subsidy was generally much lower and 
covered a smaller percentage of the project cost. Across projects, financing cost and land 
lease subsidies can plausibly explain a lower generation cost per unit of electricity of at best 
5% to 10% in the plants that got them. Therefore, the much greater reduction in actual 
plant-level prices that we observe in projects that received these two forms of support has 
to be explained by factors such as their effect on risk-reduction that helped induce 
competitive pricing behaviour. 
Figure 1 shows how different types of subsidies support private power producers in 
Bangladesh. Each plant sells power to the BPDB, the public power purchaser, at prices 
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determined at the contracting phase. The BPDB then sells the power on to distribution 
companies at a fixed policy-determined price, which can be lower than the price paid to 
many plants. The prices that plants are paid are therefore supported by a mix of what we 
describe as direct and indirect subsidies. 
Figure 1. Direct and indirect subsidies to private power plants 
 
Source: The authors. 
Direct subsidies go to power plants. They are set at the time of bidding and, once a winning 
bidder secures these subsidies, they cannot be easily changed or withdrawn. They include 
low-interest loans, usually arranged with the involvement of IFIs, and/or partial risk 
guarantees (PRGs) from them. Both reduce the cost of capital. These are some of the most 
secure forms of direct subsidy as governments cannot easily renegotiate them later.  
Direct subsidies may also include leases on government land that save the investor the 
transaction costs of acquiring, establishing and protecting land titles. Future rental rates are 
not entirely watertight as governments may try to change them regardless of contracts, but 
the major component of the subsidy is the savings in transaction costs, which are gained at 
the very outset. Finally, direct subsidies include access to subsidised gas and fuel. Fuel for 
plants is provided by the government at below-market prices, and power purchase contracts 
in Bangladesh have a pass-through clause so changes in fuel prices do not affect plants. As a 
result, this direct subsidy is also fairly secure. All private plants using the same fuel get the 
same subsidy and have similar pass-through contracts, so there is no variation in access to 
this direct subsidy across plants.  
The characteristic of direct subsidies is that they are potentially available to all investors in a 
particular project if they have the same qualifications. Even if a single investor negotiates 
these subsidies, they are potentially contestable, since competitors with similar 
qualifications cannot, in principle, be denied the same package. Direct subsidies attract 
investors because they lower their risks by reducing the portion of their costs of generation 
that they have to recover from the BPDB through sales. Variants of direct subsidies can 
therefore serve as competitive risk-mitigation instruments. 
Indirect subsidies, in contrast, are very different. After plants sell their power to a public 
aggregator like the BPDB, the latter sells on to distribution companies at its policy-
determined price. If some plant-level prices are higher than the BPDB’s selling price, losses 
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on these transactions have to be recovered in the form of transfers to the BPDB from the 
exchequer. We describe these as indirect subsidies to the relevant plants. Direct and indirect 
subsidies imply very different risks. Direct subsidies entail low risks because, once granted, 
their flow is not easily influenced by governments. In contrast, indirect subsidies have higher 
risks because they have to be periodically released by government to the BPDB before plants 
get them. Plants without political connections may perceive even higher risks as they are 
likely to be placed lower down the queue for payments if the BPDB has deficits financed by 
transfers from the exchequer. If payments to a plant become too dependent on indirect 
subsidies, unconnected investors may exit entirely. Connected companies can then further 
increase prices, with additional increases in indirect subsidies. High levels of indirect 
subsidies may therefore be indicative of collusive risk-mitigation strategies.  
Figure 1 shows there are further subsidies downstream, but these do not affect the 
determination of plant-level prices and technologies. The downstream subsidies are shown 
in italics and are triggered after the BPDB sells to distribution companies. Distribution 
companies supply different types of consumers (domestic, small industry, agricultural, 
commercial and so on) at different policy-determined prices. There are implicit cross-
subsidies at this stage across consumers as well as further transfers from the exchequer to 
cover distribution and collection losses. These have come down significantly over the last 
decade and are lower than in comparable South Asian countries (Pargal, 2017). As these 
small distribution-stage subsidies do not affect plant-level selling prices, we do not look at 
them further in this paper (Mujeri et al., 2013).  
Zhang (2019) argues that removing all subsidies in the power sector in Bangladesh will 
improve welfare because electricity is being supplied to consumers whose willingness to pay 
is lower than the generation cost of electricity. There are two main problems with such an 
argument. The first is that given the already low electricity usage and the low purchasing 
power of most consumers in Bangladesh, the willingness to pay may seriously underestimate 
the marginal social benefit of power. The second and much more serious problem is that the 
generation cost of power is not independent of public risk-mitigation strategies and the 
efficacy of subsidies that address the market failures that result in high plant-level prices. 
The price of power depends on risk-perceptions of investors that in turn determine their 
mark-ups. In a poor country where the effective demand for electricity is income and price 
constrained, and where contracts are already risky, removing all subsidies may significantly 
increase investor risks by reducing demand. That, in turn, may result in a vicious cycle of 
increased mark-ups and higher prices, further demand contractions, and even worse risk 
perceptions. The withdrawal of all subsidies is therefore unlikely to be either politically 
feasible or economically effective in lower-income countries.  
On the contrary, the Bangladesh evidence suggests that direct subsidies provided through IFI 
support and leased project land reduced risks for investors and generated reductions in 
power prices much greater than the value of the subsidies. Their removal triggered the 
emergence of much higher prices as a result of closed-door contracting and associated 
collusion. We have no reason to believe that policymakers intended the exit of unconnected 
bidders in the late 2000s by withdrawing direct subsidies. Rather, the subsidies that were 
withdrawn were not perceived to be particularly important at the time. But unconnected 
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investors largely exited the market, nonetheless. Furthermore, with only connected bidders 
competing for tenders, their internal lobbying delayed and blocked the allocation of any 
contracts, a problem that eventually led to the Speedy Power Act. 
Direct and indirect subsidies are not substitutable because of their very different effects on 
risk perceptions. A reduction in direct subsidies raises risks for power producers and they are 
likely to raise their mark-ups, resulting in a price increase greater than the reduction in the 
direct subsidy. If the distribution price is to be maintained, indirect subsidies have to 
increase by more than the cut in direct subsidies to absorb the higher mark-ups. If the 
increase in risk results in politically unconnected companies exiting the market, even greater 
price increases are likely to follow. This logic holds even if the BPDB’s distribution price is 
cost-reflective (equal to the average of plant-level prices). Cost recovery by plants may still 
require transfers to the BPDB from government, for instance if prices are so high that some 
consumers fail to pay for power, or their consumption falls which forces the BPDB to pay for 
unpurchased power in line with purchase agreements. If the potential dependence of plants 
on indirect subsidies rises, risk premia can again rise and eventually unconnected investors 
may depart, inducing further price increases. Thus, the real question is not whether to have 
cost-reflective pricing or not, but rather how to design competitive risk-mitigation strategies 
that contain plant-level prices. 
2.2. The Speedy Power Act and the cost of collusive risk 
mitigation 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the first two private power projects in Bangladesh 
achieved some of the lowest independent power producer (IPP) prices in South Asia (Pargal, 
2017). Unfortunately, the role played by competitive risk-mitigating subsidies in supporting 
this pricing was not fully understood. The subsidies were entirely withdrawn for some time 
and not systematically available thereafter. By the late 2000s, investor interest dried up, 
resulting in a severe power crisis. The only interest came from politically connected 
companies; and lobbying by competing groups blocked or delayed contracts. In the face of 
this crisis, the government passed the Speedy Supply of Power and Energy Act in 2010, which 
enabled power and energy projects to be implemented without competitive tendering. This 
collusive risk-mitigation strategy rapidly raised capacity but at a high cost and with much 
higher indirect subsidies. The higher prices and mark-ups also created huge rents that 
influenced subsequent decisions and resulted in additional distortions.  
For instance, higher-priced power plants were systematically allocated subsidised fuel in 
preference to cheaper plants whenever there were shortages. They also received priority in 
dispatch orders for delivery to the grid, selling more power than cheaper plants. A World 
Bank study of gas-fired plants from 2010 to 2015 found that, adjusted by age and capacity, 
every 1% increase in a plant’s fuel efficiency (the ratio of its power output to gas input) 
resulted in a 1.2% decrease in its probability of getting gas (Zhang, 2019). Another World 
Bank study using hourly data for dispatch orders in 2014 found that higher-cost plants were 
systematically prioritised in getting orders (Nikolakakis et al., 2017). Merit order dispatching 
requires ordering from the cheapest plants first, then sequentially from more expensive 
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ones, with the most expensive supplying peak loads. The authors estimate that keeping the 
supply of gas fixed and dispatching by merit order would have saved the government US$1.4 
billion or 63% of the payment to gas-fired plants (ibid.).  
These systematic anomalies strongly indicate collusive rent-sharing agreements. The US$1.4 
billion estimate of unnecessary overpayments for gas-based power is just part of the annual 
cost of collusion in the sector because it only covers gas-powered plants; and there were 
other types of anomalies as well. For instance, contracts with high-cost rental power plants 
often stipulated that if they were not given orders for power, they would still be paid for 
60% of the power they could have produced. This created incentives for arranging more 
than occasional non-production. These attractive terms were repeatedly renewed for some 
companies while others like the British company Aggreko had their contracts renewed with 
‘no power, no payment’ clauses, showing that, here too, some plants were treated 
differently from others (Byron and Rahman, 2014). Public-sector plants that could supply 
cheaper power also appeared to remain out of commission for unusually long periods, 
requiring base loads to be supplied by expensive private plants (Pargal, 2017). As the BPDB’s 
distribution price could not be increased in line with these plant-level price increases, the 
result was a massive increase in indirect subsidies. These currently amount to annual 
transfers of around a billion dollars from the government to the BPDB, limiting the 
sustainability of this expansion path. 
The Speedy Power Act did have some justification as an emergency response and was 
intended to last for no more than two years. However, moving back to open tendering 
required a strategy to bring back unconnected investors. That did not happen. The Act was 
extended for a further two years until 2014, again for another four years to 2018, and is 
currently being extended again until 2021. The legislation makes it illegal to subject decisions 
under this Act to any legal challenge. The underlying problems were therefore not 
addressed, and indeed the rents that emerged created interests within government, 
bureaucracy and investors to prolong these arrangements, exactly as rent-seeking theory 
would predict.  
2.3. Energy supply, transmission and distribution 
constraints 
The expansion of power generation can be constrained by shortages in upstream energy 
supply and downstream transmission and distribution problems. Both were important in 
Bangladesh as additional compounding factors.  
Early power generation was almost entirely based on gas, but by the late 2000s it was clear 
the government had not invested enough in new exploration or in infrastructure to import 
gas. A new energy policy emerged in the Power System Master Plan of 2010, which 
proposed a shift towards coal. The Plan envisaged a dramatic reduction in the share of gas 
from 89% to 25% between 2010 and 2030 and an increase in the share of coal from less than 
4% to 50% (Power Division et al., 2011). Work on a number of large public-sector coal-fired 
projects began in Rampal, Matarbari and Payra, despite considerable social opposition on 
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environmental grounds. All of them involved government-to-government agreements with a 
number of countries including India, Japan and China, although none of the projects were 
operational by 2020.  
The long-term feasibility of coal is also questionable in Bangladesh given the huge 
investments and large land areas that are required for the transportation and storage 
infrastructure and for the disposal of ash (Pargal, 2017). If the long-run cost of coal-based 
power turns out to be higher than gas, which is very possible, the huge investments in this 
infrastructure may turn out to be an expensive mistake (Ichord, 2020). The decision to invest 
US$11.38 billion in a 2,400 megawatt (MW) nuclear plant at Ruppur with Russian and Indian 
collaboration is even more questionable. Even this huge investment is set to escalate 
significantly. Maintaining nuclear safety is also a challenge in a potential earthquake zone 
and with Bangladesh’s weak governance.  
The government’s strategy of developing infrastructure for the import of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG), which can feed gas into existing pipelines, is a more comprehensible strategy 
provided LNG prices remain competitive. In the longer run, offering attractive terms for gas 
exploration onshore and in the Bay of Bengal is necessary to tap into the most promising 
source of cheap energy. Gas and renewables are environmentally superior alternatives to 
furnace oil and diesel, while coal imposes large costs on the lived environment in a land-
scarce country. Land scarcity also means that solar photovoltaic (PV) panels have a high 
opportunity cost. Moreover, the variability of sunlight means that solar power will require 
large conventional spinning reserves to make it viable, and this makes the economics of 
solar unattractive at the moment (Nikolakakis et al., 2017). While energy policy questions 
are being settled, attracting the best investments in gas-based generation is likely to be the 
most effective strategy for cheaper, cleaner power in the medium term (Ichord, 2020).  
The new risk mitigation strategy that emerged after 2010 had two separate damaging 
effects. The emergency installation of a few furnace oil and diesel plants to respond to an 
acute crisis became a sustained strategy of repeatedly renewing expensive contracts. 
Secondly, unit prices rose across all fuel types when competitive risk-mitigation subsidies 
were missing. Figure 2 shows the effects on fuel mix in the private sector after 2010. 
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Figure 2. Fuels used in private-sector plants 
 
Source: BPDB 
Figure 3. Fuels used in public-sector plants 
 
Note: HSD = High speed diesel 
Source: BPDB  
In the public sector gas continued to be important after 2010 (Figure 3), but in the longer 
term, there may be significant adverse effects on the public-sector fuel mix. As private 
investments in cheaper gas-based projects declined, the government turned to government-
to-government collaborations to implement large coal-fired and nuclear power plants. These 
may have even more damaging long-term consequences because they are more costly to 
reverse than the investments in furnace oil and diesel.  
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Transmission and distribution systems have also been constraints in Bangladesh. Transmission 
capacity has often lagged generation, holding back distribution. There were also leakages in 
transmission and distribution, but these were gradually reduced. From 2002 to 2016, 
distribution losses were reduced from 24% to less than 11% and transmission losses from 4% 
to 2.6% (Pargal, 2017). While both transmission and distribution contributed to the power 
crisis of the late 2000s, the problem was primarily a failure to attract bidders in competitive 
IPP project tenders. The subsequent increase in generation capacity overcame the crisis, but at 
a high cost. If these costs could be reduced, the savings would make other reforms easier. 
Over time, of course, improvements in power supplies require addressing the interdependent 
problems of energy supplies, power generation, transmission and distribution.  
2.4. The expansion of generation capacity  
Figure 4 shows the development of installed and peak generation capacity in Bangladesh 
from 1991 to 2019, and the acceleration of installed capacity after 2010. Peak generation 
accelerated at a slower pace. No doubt the adverse influences affecting dispatch orders, fuel 
supplies and other anomalies help explain why generation grew more slowly than capacity. 
The flatlining of generation capacity from 2004 to 2008, coinciding with a period of rapid 
economic growth, was at the heart of the power crisis. The frequent power cuts and 
shortages over this period contributed to a political crisis that brought in an emergency 
caretaker government from 2007 to 2009. The caretaker government introduced short-term 
‘rental’ power contracts as an emergency measure, structured to enable investors recover 
their investments in small power projects in two to five years. They involved the installation 
of smaller plants with enhanced capacity charges paid as rents. This proved insufficient to 
address the problem. The new government elected in 2009 went further by abandoning 
competitive tendering across the entire power and energy sector in the Speedy Power Act, 
discussed earlier.  
Figure 4. Total installed and generation capacity, Bangladesh, 1991–2019 
 
Source: BPDB Annual Reports 
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Table 2 shows the rapid growth in the number of private power plants after 2010. Initially 
these were rental and Small IPP (SIPP) projects. Larger IPP projects began to come on stream 
from 2014. Figure 5 shows the growth in capacity and generation in private plants and Figure 
6 in public plants. Both sectors came under the Speedy Power Act, but the acceleration was 
greater for the private sector with installed capacity growing from 33.6% of the total in 2010 
to 41.2% in 2018.  
Table 2. Number of power plants (private and public sector) 
Year PRIVATE PUBLIC 
IPP Rental & SIPP 
2004 6 0 18 
2005 8 0 19 
2006 8 0 19 
2007 8 0 19 
2008 6 2 19 
2009 6 10 19 
2010 6 17 19 
2011 6 33 19 
2012 6 38 31 
2013 6 38 35 
2014 11 35 36 
2015 16 37 40 
2016 18 39 40 
2017 22 36 42 
2018 34 36 52 
Note: Rental power projects have somewhat different contractual terms than IPPs and SIPPs based on rental payments that are equivalent 
to a higher capacity charge.  
Source: BPDB Annual Reports  
Figure 5. Private-sector installed and generation capacity, 2007–2018 
 
Source: BPDB Annual Reports  
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Figure 6. Public-sector installed and generation capacity, 2007–2018 
 
Source: BPDB Annual Reports  
2.5. Pricing and indirect subsidies  
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show how plant-level prices rapidly escalated after 2010, particularly in the 
private sector. The average selling price for each plant in Bangladeshi takas per kWh can be 
calculated from the plant-wise power purchase and payments data in the BPDB’s annual 
reports. The BPDB’s own selling price to distribution companies also increased after 2011 but 
could not be raised as fast as the prices charged by private power plants. The growing gap 
between the BPDB’s buying and selling prices resulted in a growing operating deficit that was 
covered by transfers from the exchequer, providing indirect subsidies to expensive plants.  
Almost all of the huge growth in the deficit of the BPDB was due to the escalation of prices 
paid to private-sector plants. The prices paid to public plants closely tracked the selling 
prices of the BPDB, but the slower growth in public-sector prices does not necessarily mean 
these plants were more efficient. When private plants are inefficient or capture 
unwarranted profits, this is usually reflected in higher selling prices. In contrast, in public 
plants, these can show up in higher prices but can also be hidden in operating losses 
financed by loans or transfers from the exchequer or other subsidies. To assess if private 
plants were truly less efficient, adjusted for fuel type and generation capacity, we would 
need to access data on all other forms of subsidies and loss financing available to public 
plants. These data are not readily available, however. 
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Figure 7. BPDB buying and selling prices averaged across all plants 
 
Source: BPDB 
Figure 8. BPDB buying and selling prices for private-sector plants 
 
Source: BPDB 
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Figure 9. BPDB buying and selling prices for public-sector plants 
 
Source: BPDB 
The growing operating deficits of the BPDB, covered by transfers from the exchequer, are 
shown in Table 3, drawing on different sources. According to World Bank sources, the 
figures from the Medium-Term Macroeconomic Policy Statements shown in the first column 
are the most robust. The BPDB’s own estimate of transfers are shown in the second column. 
They are roughly equal to the cumulative sum of figures in the first column. The last column 
reports data from the Seventh Five-Year Plan. This series is incomplete and not entirely 
consistent with the first two.  
Table 3. Measures of BPDB deficits 
Fiscal year BPDB cash loan and subsidy * 
(US$ million) 
Cumulative budget subsidy  
to BPDB ** (US$ million) 
Power-sector budgetary  
support *** (US$ million) 
2008 87.57 177.08 N/A 
2009 145.84 324.42 N/A 
2010 143.23 417.94 144.09 
2011 542.74 936.29 610.58 
2012 778.09 1622.67 734.39 
2013 577.49 2271.82 668.81 
2014 785.78 3044.74 785.78 
2015 1154.24 4218.70 771.21 
2016 355.87 4542.91 N/A 
2017 483.87 4914.45 N/A 
2018 418.16 5156.53 N/A 
2019 1088.76 N/A N/A 
Sources and notes: *Medium-Term Macroeconomic Policy Statements, Government of Bangladesh FY2014–FY2016, FY2016–FY2018, and 
FY2019–FY2021. The cash loan and subsidy to BPDB covers its transaction losses.  
**BPDB Annual Reports. The cumulative budget subsidy reported by the BPDB is roughly equal to the cumulative total of the first column.   
***Seventh Five Year Plan 2016–2020. These figures appear to be based on backward and forward extrapolations from the 2014 figure.  
N/A = not available. All taka figures converted to US$ at mid-year exchange rates. The subsidy escalation in taka is similar in orders of 
magnitude, and the escalation is not due to currency depreciation. 
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The data in Table 3 (column one) shows that the annual deficit of the BPDB grew from 
around US$87 million in 2008 to more than US$1 billion in 2015 and 2019. Both the quantity 
of power purchased and the deficit per unit of power increased over this period, but most of 
the growth in the overall deficit was due to the rapid growth in the gap between buying and 
selling prices from private plants.  
In the next section we set out our model to analyse the effect of different combinations of 
subsidies on power pricing. 
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3. A rent-seeking analysis: risks, 
subsidies and collusion  
Economic efficiency requires that power is sold at its marginal cost of generation. But with 
large fixed costs, as is typical in power generation, marginal costs may be lower than average 
costs, and plants may make losses with marginal cost pricing. Power pricing is therefore 
typically based on a fixed capacity charge and a variable component corresponding to 
marginal costs. It does not matter for efficiency whether the capacity charge is passed on to 
consumers as a standing charge or paid from general taxation (Ramsey, 1927; Hotelling, 
1938, 1939; Rhys, 2018). Prices may additionally be adjusted to account for market failures.  
The social costs of environmental damage may justify the use of taxes to further adjust the 
price of power upwards. However, in developing countries prices are likely to already be too 
high because of other market failures. These may justify price adjustments in the opposite 
direction. In particular, private investors face significant risks in contexts of weak contract 
enforcement. If this results in high-risk premia and the marking up of prices of power, the 
demand for power can shrink with negative consequences for development and welfare. In 
this case, subsidies to de-risk private investments may be justified to improve welfare. 
Welfare-enhancing pricing may therefore involve standing charges, different prices for 
different types of consumers, for different times of usage, and may be further adjusted by 
taxes, subsidies or cross-subsidisation (Friedman, 2009; Pikk and Viiding, 2013; Borenstein 
and Bushnell, 2018).  
Contracts with power plants usually describe prices as a combination of a fixed charge, a 
variable charge and supplemental charges. The fixed charge is often described as a capacity 
purchase charge, the variable or marginal charge as an energy purchase charge, and 
supplemental charges are specified for additional costs like numbers of start-ups per month 
(Jones et al., 2008). Given the contracted quantity of power that the plant has to supply, this 
gives a more or less narrow range of fluctuation for the average price P per unit of power 
from that plant. We are interested in this average purchase price, but we break it down in a 
different way to focus on the effects of risk perceptions on mark-ups. Our understanding of 
the significance of risk perceptions draws on earlier research on the power sector in 
Bangladesh as part of a World Bank mission over 2010–2011, when the importance of risk 
became clear to us in extensive conversations with stakeholders (Khan et al., 2012).  
Equation (1) shows our breakdown of the average price P at which each power plant sells a 
unit of power to the power purchaser. Plant characteristics relevant for pricing are shown by 
subscripts T and K, where T stands for technology and K for political connections. The 
technical characteristics of a plant refer to its fuel specification (gas, furnace oil, diesel etc.), 
its rated capacity (in MW), its age (as a proxy for the vintage of its technology and any time-
specific factors affecting prices). The political connections of the plant, shown by subscript K, 
takes two values, K=u if the plant is unconnected and K=c if connected. Connected owners 
have close relationships with bureaucrats and politicians who are sufficiently powerful to 
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sort out delays in payments or other contracting issues affecting them. Plant owners who do 
not have such relationships are unconnected even if otherwise powerful. 
𝑃𝑇𝐾 =  𝐶𝑇𝐾 +  𝑀𝑇𝐾 −  𝐷𝑆𝑇 (1) 
The price, 𝑃𝑇𝐾, of each plant is divided into three components: 𝐶𝑇𝐾, the average generation 
cost for the plant, including both fixed and variable costs; 𝑀𝑇𝐾, the mark-up per unit of 
power; and 𝐷𝑆𝑇, the direct subsidy per unit of power to the plant. 
The power purchaser buys power at plant-specific prices 𝑃𝑇𝐾, but sells to distribution 
companies at a market or policy-determined price ?̅? , which may be lower than 𝑃𝑇𝐾  for 
particular plants. When it is lower, the BPDB makes a loss on the transaction, which has to 
be covered by transfers. This is the indirect subsidy to the plants in question, shown as 𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐾 
in Equation (2). In the case of Bangladesh, the BPDB has been in overall and growing deficit 
throughout our period of concern so these transfers have required the release of more and 
more money from the exchequer. Plants that are more reliant on indirect subsidies face 
greater uncertainty about payment flows as discussed earlier. 
𝐼𝑓 ?̅? <  𝑃𝑇𝐾 ,            ?̅?  =  𝑃𝑇𝐾 −  𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐾 (2) 
Combining Equations (1) and (2), Equation (3) shows that the selling price of the BPDB, ?̅?, 
can be supported at the plant level by a combination of a direct subsidy DS, and an indirect 
subsidy IS, given the costs of generation, C, and mark-ups M. 
?̅? =  𝐶𝑇𝐾 + 𝑀𝑇𝐾 − 𝐷𝑆𝑇  −  𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐾 (3) 
Although direct and indirect subsidies appear to be equivalent in Equation (3), they are not. 
They have different effects on risks and therefore on the mark-ups of plants. A cut in the 
direct subsidy to a plant of one cent can trigger an increase in a plant’s unit selling price by 
more than one cent if the investor perceives greater risks, and as a result increases their risk-
adjusted mark-up M. To maintain the BPDB’s selling price ?̅?, the indirect subsidy has to 
increase by more than one cent to compensate for the cut in direct subsidy and the increase 
in the mark-up. The withdrawal of direct subsidies may eventually raise risk to the point that 
unconnected firms drop out entirely. This can result in a dramatic increase in the mark-ups 
and prices of connected companies, not because they perceive more risk, but because they 
can now collude with authorities to set higher mark-ups and prices. These increases also 
have to be covered by indirect subsidies.  
To show the relationships between risks and mark-ups, we define the variable 𝑑𝑇𝐾 in 
Equation (4) to measure the dependence of a plant on the riskier indirect subsidies. The 
variable 𝑑𝑇𝐾 measures the share of generation costs not covered by low-risk streams of 
payments. The part of the generation cost covered by the BPDB’s selling price ?̅? is fairly 
secure because consumers of electricity are paying this to the BPDB. The part covered by 
direct subsidies, 𝐷𝑆𝑇, is also fairly secure as discussed earlier. The balance of the generation 
cost measured by 𝑑𝑇𝐾 has to be recovered through indirect subsidies that have higher risk, 
particularly for unconnected investors. 
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𝑑𝑇𝐾  =  
𝐶𝑇𝐾  −  𝐷𝑆𝑇  − ?̅?
𝐶𝑇𝐾
 (4) 
A higher 𝑑𝑇𝐾 means that a greater proportion of generation costs depend on the riskier 
transfers from the exchequer. The risk perception of the investor, 𝑟𝑇𝐾, is likely to go up as 
this fraction increases, as described in Equation (5). 
𝑟𝑇𝐾 = 𝑓(𝑑𝑇𝐾 , 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑛) (5) 
A plant’s risk perception is a function of its dependence on indirect subsidies, 𝑑𝑇𝐾, and other 
country- and sector-specific risk factors X1, X2, …, Xn. Risks for all firms increase with 𝑑𝑇𝐾, but 
are likely to be higher and rise more steeply for unconnected companies (K=u) relative to 
connected ones (K=c), as shown in Equations (6) and (7). 
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑑
> 0 (6) 
 
𝜕𝑟𝑢
𝜕𝑑
 >  
𝜕𝑟𝑐
𝜕𝑑
 (7) 
The relationships between risk perceptions and 𝑑𝑇𝐾 for politically connected and unconnected 
plants are shown in Figure 10. The critical risk level r* is the level of risk above which firms 
desist from bidding for that project. As 𝑑𝑇𝐾 increases, unconnected investors are therefore 
likely to exit first, and this happens when 𝑑𝑇𝐾 reaches d
*.  
Figure 10. Indirect subsidies and investor risk perceptions 
 
Source: The authors 
  
Cheaper, cleaner power: De-risking as an anti-collusion strategy in Bangladesh 
27 
We can now trace how risk affects pricing through the mark-up. As risks go up, all investors 
gradually increase their risk-adjusted mark-ups. However, mark-ups also depend on the 
degree of competition in the market. As risks go up, at some point unconnected investors 
exit the market. At this point, the mark-ups of the remaining connected investors can display 
a discontinuous step-change as collusive price-setting becomes possible – and indeed, 
without collusive risk-mitigating government assurances, investments are unlikely to 
happen. Equation (8) describes the discontinuity in the rate of increase of the mark-up as 
dependence, 𝑑, increases. 
𝑀𝑇𝐾 =  {
𝑀𝑇𝑢 = 𝑔(𝑟𝑇𝑈, 𝑌1, 𝑌2, … 𝑌𝑛 , 𝑛𝑢)           𝑖𝑓 𝑑 <  𝑑
∗
 𝑀𝑇𝑐 = ℎ(𝑟𝑇𝐶 , 𝑌1, 𝑌2, … 𝑌𝑛)                  𝑖𝑓 𝑑 ≥  𝑑
∗ (8) 
When 𝑑 <  𝑑∗, the mark-up, 𝑀𝑇𝐾, is constrained by the mark-up accepted by unconnected 
investors. Connected investors cannot set a mark-up much higher than unconnected 
investors will accept. This is shown in function 𝑔 where the mark-up is set by the risk 
perceptions of unconnected investors, 𝑟𝑇𝑈, other country- and sector-specific variables 
𝑌1, 𝑌2, … 𝑌𝑛, (which can include rules of competition and procurement, governance variables 
and so on) and 𝑛𝑢, the number of unconnected bidders in that bid. The last is a critical 
determinant of effective competition, because for procurement and governance rules to 
work in these contexts, there must be at least one unconnected bidder with the capability to 
put together a feasible bid. If such competitors exist, they are likely to protest if they suspect 
collusion in the granting of contracts. Protests are likely to trigger effective investigations if 
IFIs or similar organisations are involved in financing projects, if only because they are 
concerned about their own reputations. As a result, when unconnected bidders are in the 
running, even if a connected bidder wins a bid, they are likely to have to match or improve 
on the costs and mark-ups of the former. When d is in this range, an increase in d will have 
an incremental effect on risks 𝑟𝑇𝐾, and therefore on mark-ups in line with function g in the 
top line of equation (8). However, when 𝑑 ≥  𝑑∗, a different function, ℎ, emerges, because 
after unconnected investors exit, mark-ups are set by the collusive behaviour of connected 
investors. The number of unconnected bidders, 𝑛𝑢, is now zero and the mark-up can jump to 
a higher level.  
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Figure 11. The discontinuity in mark-ups  
 
Note: (g) and (h) refer to the functions in Equation (8) 
Source: The authors 
Figure 11 shows the discontinuity in the mark-up that emerges as 𝑑 increases. After the exit 
of unconnected bidders, collusive arrangements are much more difficult to expose or 
challenge. No bidder is likely to make a complaint to external bodies as investigations are 
likely to reveal their own collusion. Intense competition is still likely, but it will probably 
include rent-sharing arrangements. As a result, we expect higher levels of collusion and rent-
sharing beyond 𝑑∗. 
We can now see what happens to pricing in Equation (9), which parallels and accentuates 
the discontinuity in mark-ups shown in (8). When 𝑑 <  𝑑∗, both costs and mark-ups are 
constrained by what unconnected companies would accept. Beyond 𝑑∗, unconnected 
companies drop out. This has a discontinuous effect on mark-ups, and in addition, the 
generation costs of connected companies, 𝐶𝑇𝑐, are also likely to rise once unconnected 
companies exit. Costly technologies with worse environmental implications may be selected 
if these achieve even faster paybacks or if they are technologies from which connected 
investors can otherwise profit by supplying. 
𝑃𝑇𝐾 =  {
𝐶𝑇𝑢 +  𝑀𝑇𝑢 − 𝐷𝑆𝑇    𝑖𝑓  𝑑 <  𝑑
∗
𝐶𝑇𝑐 +  𝑀𝑇𝑐 − 𝐷𝑆𝑇     𝑖𝑓 𝑑 ≥  𝑑
∗ (9) 
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Figure 12. Power prices and indirect subsidies  
 
Note: Based on Equation (9). 
Source: The authors 
Figure 12 shows this graphically. As 𝑑 increases, direct subsidies fall, and this arithmetically 
raises prices (Equation 1). In addition, mark-ups increase, raising prices further. But most 
importantly, after 𝑑∗, mark-ups jump and generation costs 𝐶𝑇𝐾 may also increase. As a result, 
after that point, prices rise faster still. We can now see why direct and indirect subsidies are 
not equivalent. A cut in direct subsidies will not only necessitate an arithmetic increase in 
indirect subsidies, but also a progressively greater increase to compensate for the growth in 
risk-related mark-ups (even before the point 𝑑∗) and a sharp increase in mark-ups and possibly 
also in generation costs after the point 𝑑∗ when unconnected investors exit. Indirect subsidies 
can therefore be expected to rise rapidly when direct subsidies are cut. 
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4. Evidence: the effect of competitive 
risk-mitigation on prices, 2008–2016 
We test the effects of direct subsidies on plant-level prices in 58 private power plants in 
Bangladesh from 2008–2016 for which comparable price and technical data are available. 
Our analysis predicts that if direct subsidies are large enough to reduce risk to a level that 
makes unconnected investors interested in a bid, plant-level prices will be substantially 
lower, much lower than can be directly attributed to the subsidies alone. Furthermore, we 
should see this effect even if unconnected investors did not bid for a particular project or did 
not win the bid: their potential entry may be sufficient to achieve the beneficial effect on 
pricing. To test this hypothesis, we can investigate if some combination of direct subsidies 
results in a significant discontinuity in plant prices after adjusting for fuel type, generation 
capacity and time-dependent characteristics.  
The annual reports of the BPDB record the power purchased from each plant and the 
amounts paid to each. This gives us the plant-level purchase price per kWh by year and we 
use the data from 2008 to 2016 to get the average price paid to each plant over this period. 
As the commissioning agency, the BPDB also provides technical data for each plant including 
its date of commissioning, installed capacity, current capacity and the type of fuel used. The 
industry association, BIPPA, helped us by conducting a survey of its members to identify 
plants that had received leased land from the government or had acquired low-interest 
credit directly or indirectly from an IFI or had been granted partial risk guarantees. We cross-
checked this information and filled in gaps, particularly for IFI support, with the help of 
power-sector specialists at the World Bank in Dhaka and independent consultants in the 
power sector.  
The mix of connected and unconnected investors who participated in tenders in the past 
cannot be directly observed. Moreover, many projects changed hands several times after 
commissioning. We asked a leading financial journalist to identify the owners of plants in our 
study and trace their political links. Not surprisingly, we found that almost every plant is 
currently owned by politically connected groups, even if some contracts were originally won 
by unconnected companies. Fortunately, plant-level prices are bound by original contracts 
and year-to-year variations are negligible even if ownership changes. Moreover, our 
hypothesis does not require that contracts should be won by unconnected companies for 
prices to be low. All that is required is the presence of direct subsidies on a sufficient scale to 
achieve competitive risk-mitigation. This makes the bid potentially contestable and lower 
prices should follow regardless of the current ownership of plants, and regardless of 
whether the winning bidder was politically connected or not. Since our hypothesis is about 
potential competition from unconnected companies at the time of bidding, rather than the 
identity of the winning bidder, we do not need to identify the political connections of each 
plant to test our hypothesis.  
Of the three direct subsidies referred to earlier, the fuel subsidy with a pass-through 
benefits all plants using that fuel and there is no variation across plants. However, the other 
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two – leases on government land and access to low-cost financing and IFI PRGs – were 
available in some projects but not others over the period we are interested in. If a plant does 
not currently record these subsidies, we assume they were not available at the bidding 
stage. This is because if a losing bidder with a lower bid price had access to these subsidies, 
particularly IFI support, they would have triggered a third-party investigation if they were 
unfairly excluded. And if a bidder with a higher price had access to these subsidies, the 
winning bidder with lower prices would have asked why they were not eligible. We have no 
knowledge of such challenges, so it is unlikely that these subsidies were available to a losing 
bidder and not the winning one. This logic is much more credible for IFI support than for 
government land leases. If a land lease is available on its own to a politically connected 
company, unconnected companies may not be able to contest it in the same way. 
Nevertheless, if land leases are combined with IFI support, this package of direct subsidies 
does become contestable.  
Crucially, we know that access to IFI support is not a function of political connections. There 
are a small number of players in the power sector and many that have received IFI support 
in new projects are known connected companies. This is important because if IFIs only 
extended support to companies without political connections, the lower prices in these 
projects may simply have reflected a selection bias preventing collusive price-setting. In 
reality, the same connected companies got IFI support in some projects and not in other 
similar projects, and their pricing was different across these projects. The factors that 
determined if one of several agencies would financially support particular projects appear to 
be linked to the timing of projects, the funding cycles of agencies and the initiative of 
particular insiders within funding bodies and business groups. The observation that selection 
was not based on the political status of companies allows us to exclude this as a control 
variable affecting the selection of treatment groups.  
The direct financing of power projects by IFIs ended with Meghnaghat and Haripur. After a 
hiatus, IFI support returned in a number of different forms. All of these did not count as 
competitive risk-mitigating instruments. For that, support has to fulfil two necessary 
conditions. First, it must lower the cost of financing, thereby providing an implicit subsidy. 
Secondly, it has to be ‘contestable’, meaning that the support is in principle available to 
other bidders. Even if negotiated with a single bidder, the latter’s governance, procurement 
and pricing should potentially be open to scrutiny by competitors contesting procedures. IFI 
support that satisfies these conditions reduces risks and attracts unconnected companies 
either as actual contestants or as potential scrutinisers. In either case we expect an effect on 
pricing. Appendix B lists the types of financing support currently available from international 
agencies and the ones that we include because they satisfy our two conditions. As interest 
rates and shares of project financing from different sources are commercially sensitive data 
that plants do not share, we cannot estimate the value of the IFI support to each plant. 
Instead we use a binary variable to label the presence or absence of financial support 
satisfying our criteria in each plant. A similar binary variable records the presence or absence 
of leased government land in each plant. 
Table 4 is a descriptive summary of the 58 plants. The average plant-level price for a kWh of 
power over this period was 8.95 takas, ranging from 1.41 to 23.35 takas. Of the 58 plants, 
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12.1% had access to IFI support satisfying our conditions, 36.2% had leases on government 
land, and 10.3% had both IFI support and leased government land. The average age of plants 
was 7.3 years and the average generation capacity was 73.5 MW. The usage of different 
fuels is also shown – for instance, 44.8% of plants were gas-based, 43.8% used furnace oil 
and the rest used diesel or high-speed diesel (HSD). 
Table 4. Summary statistics of 58 private power plants, 2008–2016 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
BPDB purchase price (taka per kWh)  8.95 6.54 1.41 23.35 
Access to IFI support/partial risk guarantees  0.121  0 1 
Access to government land leases  0.362  0 1 
Access to both IFI support AND leased land   0.103  0 1 
Plant age 7.33 4.18 1 20 
Present capacity (MW)  73.47 40.47 0 195 
Fuel: gas 0.448  0 1 
Fuel: heavy furnace oil (HFO) 0.431  0 1 
Fuel: diesel 0.069  0 1 
Fuel: HSD 0.051  0 1 
Note: Plant purchase prices are weighted averages of prices paid to each plant over the period. Standard deviations are reported for non-
binary data. 
Source: BPDB, BIPPA, World Bank.  
Table 5 summarises the plant-level prices in plants with different combinations of direct 
subsidies. The averages immediately show that plants with access to both IFI support and 
land leases, or just IFI support, had lower prices than plants without, adjusting for type of 
fuel, the most important determinant of plant-level prices. Plants that received only land 
leases display anomalous results, with the expected effect only visible for diesel plants. This 
is not surprising given that land leases on their own are not a strongly contestable direct 
subsidy. Of course, the averages hide much variation within groups and there are other 
relevant variables affecting price that are not included in the table. 
Table 5. Power prices in plants with different direct subsidy combinations (Taka/kWh) 
Fuel Type IFI support AND leased land IFI support alone Leased land alone 
Plants with Without Plants with Without Plants with Without 
Gas 2.17 3.07 2.41 3.35 3.60 3.01 
HFO 9.86 11.64 10.00 12.97 16.44 11.12 
Diesel - 23.89 - 18.00 16.22 23.35 
HSD 22.26 - - 19.98 19.98 - 
Note: Blank price cells appear when there are no plants in that category. ‘Plants with’ are treatment plants and ‘without’ are control groups.   
Source: BPDB, BIPPA, World Bank. 
Simple regression results in Table 6 confirm that leased land on its own has no significant 
effect on prices, supporting the observation in Table 5. In contrast, IFI support on its own has 
a significant negative effect on plant-level prices, and the negative effect is highest when 
plants receive both IFI support and land leases. 
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Table 6. Regression results 
Independent variables Dependent variable: log price per kWh 
Both IFI support and leased land -0.329** 
(0.165) 
  
IFI support  -0.212* 
(0.124) 
 
 
Leased land   0.065 
(0.091) 
Log plant age 0.100 
(0.087) 
0.059 
(0.086) 
0.076 
(0.092) 
Log present plant capacity 0.069 
(0.060) 
0.011 
(0.052) 
-0.007 
(0.058) 
Fuel: diesel (reference group)    
Fuel: gas -1.349*** 
(0.163) 
-1.416*** 
(0.160) 
-1.447*** 
(0.161) 
Fuel: HFO -0.216 
(0.160) 
-0.207 
(0.163) 
-0.259* 
(0.164) 
Fuel: HSD 0.488* 
(0.261) 
0.273 
(0.239) 
0.290 
(0.236) 
R-squared 0.850 0.851 0.844 
Source: The authors. 
However, regression analysis cannot satisfactorily adjust for the possible co-determination of 
independent and dependent variables. We use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to address 
possible selection biases that may lead to a correlation between the receipt of IFI support 
and/or leased land and plant-level prices. Following Rubin (1974) and Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), the PSM method allows for the correction of possible selection bias by comparing 
plants that received IFI support and/or leased land with similar plants that did not, based on 
their propensity scores. In comparison with other estimation methods, the PSM gives a more 
accurate non-experimental estimate of the treatment effect (McKenzie et al., 2010).  
Let 𝐷𝑖=1 if power plant i received the direct subsidy or combination of subsidies, and 𝐷𝑖 = 0 if 
not; let 𝑌1𝑖 be our outcome of interest (plant-level power prices) for plants with the treatment 
and 𝑌0𝑖 be the outcome for plants without the treatment: the control group. Using PSM, our 
parameter of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is calculated 
by subtracting the average outcomes in the treatment group from those in the control group 
at a particular propensity score of the balanced covariates or control variables.  
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌|𝐷 = 1, 𝑃(𝑋)] − 𝐸[𝑌|𝐷 = 0, 𝑃(𝑋)] (10) 
where 𝐸[𝑌|𝐷 = 1, 𝑃(𝑋)] is the expected value of the plant-level price in plants with the 
treatment, given the covariates 𝑋; and 𝐸[𝑌|𝐷 = 0, 𝑃(𝑋)] is the expected value of plant-level 
prices in plants without the direct subsidy or subsidy combination in question, given the 
covariates 𝑋. The PSM estimates are based on the conditional independence assumption, 
which states that, conditional on X, the potential outcomes are independent of the 
treatment status. After controlling for the observable covariates X (plant age, present plant 
Cheaper, cleaner power: De-risking as an anti-collusion strategy in Bangladesh 
34 
capacity, and fuel type dummies), the treatment assignment is as close to random as we can 
achieve with observational data (Lechner, 1999). Using the control variables discussed 
earlier, Table 7 presents the results.  
Table 7. Treatment effect using propensity score matching 
Treatment variable ATT on log of plant-
level price 
Standard 
error 
t-statistic Percentage change 
in price due to 
treatment 
BOTH IFI support AND  
leased land from government  
-0.969*** 0.199 -4.876 -62.1% 
IFI support  -0.204** 0.100 -2.035 -18.5% 
Leased land from government 0.020 0.403 0.051 Not significant 
Notes:  ** and *** indicate significance at 5%, and 1%, respectively. Control variables include plant age, present plant capacity, and 
dummy variables for fuel types (gas, HFO, diesel, and HSD). The dependent variable is the log of plant-level prices. As the ATT is in logs, the 
actual percentage change in plant-level prices in the last column is exp(ATT)-1.  
Source: The authors. 
The PSM estimates confirm that land leases on their own had no significant effect on plant-
level prices. This is consistent with our expectations and confirms that, on their own, land 
leases are not contestable direct subsidies that can induce competitive bidding. In contrast, 
IFI support on its own reduced plant-level prices by 18.5%. This is significant at the 5% level 
and is much higher than any plausible arithmetic effect of lower interest costs on power 
prices. This is consistent with our explanation of likely effects operating through competitive 
risk-mitigation on mark-ups and prices. However, the most significant results are achieved 
when IFI support is combined with land leases, when there is a 62.1% reduction of plant-
level prices, significant at the 1% level. The large discontinuous effect here suggests that this 
combination of direct subsidies had the characteristics of a contestable risk-mitigating 
subsidy that lowered dependence on risky cost recovery to below the level 𝑑∗ in Figure 12. 
The large and significant reduction in prices therefore has a plausible explanation.  
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5. Conclusion: a feasible anti-
collusion strategy  
The theory and evidence discussed here shows that contestable direct subsidies can and 
have functioned as risk-mitigating instruments supporting competitive behaviour. In their 
absence, collusive relationships between business and government emerged to solve the 
investment problem in Bangladesh. Mark-ups and prices rapidly increased, and the rents 
generated supported further corruption that drove anomalies in dispatch orders, the 
preferential supply of fuel, the preferential renewal of contracts, and so on, which have all 
been observed in Bangladesh. Different estimates of the social cost of this collusion and 
corruption consistently value it at much greater than US$1 billion a year.  
Figure 13. Subsidies, risks, collusion and corruption  
 
Source: The authors. 
The collusion and corruption in the sector can be attributed to many factors, but most of 
these are not feasible policy variables. For instance, the collusion could be correctly 
attributed to the absence of competitive tendering and the weak enforcement of 
procurement rules, but this does not identify a feasible policy response. How do we enforce 
procurement rules or return to competitive tendering if politically unconnected companies 
refuse to bid? The deficits of the BPDB are clearly a problem but how do we reduce these 
deficits without raising the prices of power to economically and politically unsustainable 
levels? Our search for a feasible policy variable was therefore driven not just by the 
evidence, but by an understanding of how risk affects investment decisions. That helped to 
identify feasible policy instruments whose likely effects we then validated with evidence.  
An understanding of the powerful groups in the sector, their interests and capabilities – 
which can be described as the sectoral political settlement – underpins our analysis by 
suggesting anti-collusion strategies that may be resisted, but not so much that they have a 
very low chance of success. Clearly, we can expect rent-seeking interests to range against 
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the implementation of a strategy that will have the effect of reducing uncompetitive rents. 
Nevertheless, the strategy may be feasible to implement, particularly if the fiscal crisis of the 
sector begins to increase risks for incumbents and slows down the government’s plans for 
expanding power supplies. Our evidence shows that many powerful business groups 
engaged in the sector have both treated and untreated plants in their portfolio. When policy 
creates a more competitive environment, even connected companies are able to deliver 
better prices, and still make sufficient profits. Obviously in the absence of competitive 
pressures, the same groups take the opportunity to raise prices. However, as competitive 
generation is sufficiently profitable in the presence of moderate risk mitigation, there is no 
evidence that the provision of preferential financing, together with government land leases, 
has been strongly opposed by anyone. Instead, broadening the availability of these 
incentives to cover most or all projects may work to change the behaviour of existing players 
in a more productive direction, which many connected firms have already demonstrated is 
possible in particular projects.   
The anti-corruption approach suggested here is one of ‘designing for differences’ (Khan et 
al., 2019). Different types of investors, depending on their political connections, perceive the 
risks associated with payments from a loss-making public purchaser very differently. The 
more their payments depend on transfers from the exchequer, the greater their risk, and 
risk is even greater if they are unconnected companies. By understanding these differences, 
feasible changes in policy can increase the probability that unconnected investors become 
potential entrants, which creates competitive pressures that can contain mark-ups, prices 
and corruption. Relatively small risk-mitigating subsidies can reduce average plant-level 
prices by more than 60%, and if widely implemented, this would significantly reduce or 
eliminate the avoidable deficit of the BPDB, which is the most direct measure of the social 
cost of collusive pricing. In addition, removing the distortionary rents created by overpricing 
can also reduce the associated corruption that drives anomalies in dispatch orders, gas 
supplies, the choice of inferior technologies and other decisions that further add to the 
social cost of the collusive power market. As the reduction in plant-level prices and therefore 
the savings in the social cost of power is a large multiple of the direct subsidies, the latter 
may be more usefully regarded as public co-investments in projects, with a high rate of 
social return, rather than as subsidies.   
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Appendix A. Early projects with direct 
IFI financing  
The two earliest projects that received direct IFI financing were Haripur and Meghnaghat. 
The contract for the 360 MW Haripur gas-fired IPP was won by the American company AES 
and operations began in 2001. The tariff contracted was US$0.0277/kWh. Debt constituted 
63% of project financing.  
As Table A 1 shows, the cost of capital was significantly reduced by direct lending by the 
World Bank at their international lending rates, which are lower than those available in the 
local market, and a PRG that reduced the cost of other commercial credit.  
Table A 1. Financial structure of Haripur power project 
 Million USD  
Equity:   
Sponsor equity 31.0 17% 
Subordinated sponsor loan 37.0 20% 
  68.0 37% 
Debt:   
Commercial debt* 60.9 33% 
IFC direct loan 40.0 22% 
IFC syndicated loan 14.0 8% 
  114.9 63% 
Total 182.9 100% 
* guaranteed with the International Development Association’s (IDA) US$60.9 million  
PRG based on government indemnity agreement with IDA, achieving US Libor rate + 2%.  
International Financial Corporation’s (IFC) direct and syndicated loans at international market rates.  
The IFC and IDA are both part of the World Bank Group.  
Source: Asian Tigers Capital Partners (2010) 
The 450 MW Meghnaghat gas-fired IPP was also developed by AES Corporation and 
contracted in 1999. Here, debt was 73% of the project cost. As Table A 2 shows, here too, 
IFIs provided direct financing and PRGs, including A and B loans from the ADB, a commercial 
loan tranche covered by a PRG from ADB, as well as loans from IDCOL, which was in turn 
financed by the IFIs. Pricing on the PRG-backed loan tranche was 200 basis points over 
LIBOR, while the B loan was priced at 350 basis points over LIBOR.  
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Table A 2. Financial structure of Meghnaghat power project 
 Million USD  
Equity:   
Sponsor equity 80.0 26.7% 
  80.0 26.7% 
Debt:   
ADB Loan 50.0 16.7% 
Commercial Banks* (ADB PRG) 70.0 23.3% 
Commercial Banks (ADB scheme) 20.0 6.7% 
IDCOL 80.0 26.7% 
  220.0 73.3% 
Total 300.0 100.0% 
* guaranteed with US$70 million political risk ADB PRG scheme with government  
counter guarantee to ADB. LIBOR + spread determined by Interest Rate Committee.  
IDCOL loan via IDA. 
Source: Asian Tigers Capital Partners (2010) 
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Appendix B. Contemporary financing 
by IFIs and development banks 
Direct financing by IFIs was largely discontinued after the first two projects in Haripur and 
Meghnaghat that still produce some of the cheapest power in Bangladesh. IDCOL too shifted 
its attention to other infrastructure projects and later to solar power, though some direct 
involvement of IFIs and IDCOL continued on a smaller scale in later years. Bidders in power 
projects had to arrange their own financing to a much greater extent or entirely. From 2006 
the World Bank provided funding for power plants as part of its Investment Promotion and 
Financing Facility (IPFF). This provided interest-free loans to the Bangladesh Bank, which 
then provided credit to commercial banks, who in turn lent to projects. As the loans are 
ultimately made by local banks in local currency, the interest rates are the standard 
commercial rates in local banks. Typically, these loans do not provide any significant element 
of direct subsidy, though the IPFF funding enhances the lending capacity of local banks. As 
there is no significant subsidy element, we exclude IPFF loans from our list of competitive 
risk-mitigating direct subsidies.  
We also exclude credit provided by export credit agencies (ECAs). These are agencies in 
exporting countries that provide financing to importers, in this case importers of power 
plant equipment. Here, even if there is an interest rate subsidy, the benefit is restricted to a 
particular supplier from the exporting country and their importing partner. Lowering the 
cost of this finance reduces risk for the specific exporter and importer, but the benefit is 
shared between the exporter and importer and may not be passed on as lower power prices. 
This is because the risk mitigation here is exclusive to the companies involved. Potential 
competitors, particularly from other countries, do not in principle have access to this ECA 
credit nor do they have the right to raise questions about procurement processes and 
possible overpricing of the machinery or of power. This would be very different if the credit 
had been in the form of an IFI loan. Hence, ECA credit does not have the effect of a 
competitive risk-mitigating subsidy. The same holds true for exporter’s credit organised by 
the exporter using export-promotion banks in their home country. These arrangements are 
often used by machinery suppliers, including from China, but do not count as competitive 
risk-mitigation subsidies.  
However, IFIs continue to support particular power projects in new ways that have 
competitive risk-mitigation effects. PRGs from IFIs were later complemented by guarantees 
from the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which provided 
guarantees against non-commercial risks like political risks and breach of contract. These are 
significant risks in developing countries and these guarantees reduce the cost of capital. As 
they are available to any investor or supplier competing for a tender who satisfies eligibility 
criteria, the benefits are in principle not limited to a particular investor. The recipients of a 
MIGA guarantee are therefore open to scrutiny by competitors and adverse procurement or 
pricing behaviour could trigger World Bank scrutiny if necessary. We include MIGA risk 
guarantees as an IFI instrument that works as a competitive risk-mitigation strategy.  
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The International Finance Corporation (IFC) has also recently invested in a number of power 
projects in Bangladesh with loans and equity. As their investments are linked to international 
(LIBOR) interest rates and not the high interest rates in domestic banks, IFC investment or 
financing provides an element of financing subsidy that is also in the public domain and open 
to competitors to challenge if their own investment package is technically or commercially 
superior. Therefore, we count IFC financing as a competitive risk-mitigation instrument.  
Bilateral development banks have occasionally invested in private power projects in 
Bangladesh. They include the German Development Finance Institution DEG, (Deutsche 
Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft) and the Dutch Development Bank FMO 
(Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden). Their involvement is 
still relatively small, but these investments are similar to those by the IFC even if these are 
not multilateral IFIs. Their investments in equity or financing at interest rates lower than 
those available in the domestic market lower the cost of capital for a firm that has to then 
price in a competitive way. Competitors can potentially challenge these financing decisions if 
the prices offered by the supported company are uncompetitive. Therefore, these types of 
financing should also count as competitive risk-mitigation instruments. 
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